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RADIO PROPAGANDA REPORT

CHINESE COMMUNIST BROADCASTS TO FORMOSA

FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE

Basic Survey Series

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CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
1 APRIL 1955

- 1 -

CHINESE COMMUNIST BROADCASTS TO FORMOSA

1. Special Programs for Formosans: The four daily Chinese Communist broadcasts addressed to Formosan listeners were inaugurated early in the Formosa liberation campaign on 15 August 1954. Two hour-long programs in Mandarin seem tailored to appeal to refugee mainland Chinese, Nationalist Government personnel and the army; the other two programs in the Amoy dialect are apparently aimed at the indigenous Formosan population. The content of the four programs is uniform in most respects, although defection appeals appear more frequently in the Mandarin-language programs and the Amoy-dialect broadcasts place greater stress on the more generalized propaganda theme of Asian opposition to U.S. pressure.

Programs during sample two-week periods in November 1954 and March 1955 have been scrutinized for the purposes of this report.

2. Reduced Emphasis on Liberation: Material related to Formosan liberation in the Formosa-beamed programs dropped from 40 percent of all items during the November period to 26 percent in March. The two periods are comparable in that Peking's Home Service attention to Formosa during both was at a low level--roughly three to six percent of the items broadcast to the domestic audience. Concentration on subjects related to the liberation campaign is normally higher in the programs to the island than in either the Home or International Service.
3. Defection Appeals: The special purpose of the Formosa-beamed programs is reflected in their concentration on propaganda calculated to induce defection from Nationalist ranks; in November desertion appeals constituted 62 percent of all broadcast items dealing with Formosa, and the volume rose slightly to 68 percent in March. References to desertion do not appear in appreciable volume in the Home and International Services. The listener might be led to consider this propaganda successful from a comparison between the originators of the defection appeals during the two periods. In November there were almost twice as many appeals authored by former Kuomintang personnel who had never left the mainland as messages from recent defectors and reports about recent defections. In March the proportion was almost completely reversed.

The nature of the material, however, remains unchanged. Calculated to appeal to personal as well as patriotic motives, the broadcasts feature: (a) glorified accounts of the new life on the mainland as opposed to conditions prevailing under Nationalist rule, both on the mainland before "liberation" and currently on Formosa; (b) references to the Chinese Communist Government's "lenient" policy concerning defectors as revealed through statements by Government personnel and through Government directives such as that issued by Defense Minister Peng Te-huai on 31 December 1954; (c) references to the weakness of the Nationalist position in the face of the rising power of the CPR, as evidenced particularly by Chinese "defeat" of the U.S. forces in Korea and by the forced evacuation of the Tachens and Nanchishan; and (d) documentation of Formosa's historic ties with the mainland.

An effort is made to convince those on Formosa that they now have an opportunity to remove the stigma of their past errors by participating in the liberation campaign either through overt acts such as outright defection or through discreet but effective opposition to the policy of the Nationalist

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

PROPAGANDA REPORT
1 APRIL 1955

- 2 -

Government and the United States. Recent messages, such as that by former Kuomintang general Wei Li-huang, stress the traitorous character of Chiang Kai-shek and liken him to Chinese collaborators with the Japanese. Wei also emphasizes the personal injustices suffered under the Chiang regime.

Defection appeals are apparently directed exclusively to the mainland Chinese on Formosa in the Government and army. The use of Nationalist soldiers captured in the Ichangshan assault brought a temporary increase in the number of appeals to military men, but the targets of current appeals are about equally divided between Government and Army personnel. Appeals are addressed both to general categories of people such as "former colleagues and friends" or "customs officers" and to specific individuals. Some are addressed by persons on the mainland to relatives on Formosa, but Peking has not paralleled Pyongyang's widespread use of this technique during the North Korean unification campaign in the fall of 1954, when thousands of South Koreans received personal appeals.

4. Exploitation of Grievances: There has to date been only a minor effort to play on grievances of the Formosan population. Economic difficulties brought about by the presence of the Nationalist government on the island, a subject presumably exploitable in any major effort to create dissension and unrest among the population, have been given equally minor emphasis in the Mandarin and Amoy-dialect programs. Attention to the 28 February anniversary of the 1947 Formosa uprising against Nationalist rule was about the same in both languages--seven items in Amoy and six in Mandarin. Recent Chinese Communist reports on the Nationalist decision to induct native Formosans into the ROC army may, however, occasion an increase in appeals to the indigenous audience.
5. Formosa Events: Other components of the Formosa-oriented material in the Mandarin and Amoy-dialect programs duplicate Peking's regular liberation campaign themes and are geared to objective developments; during the fighting around the offshore islands in November, all Chinese Communist propaganda featured reports of the encounters, but in March there was no discussion of the hostilities in any Peking broadcasts.
6. Other Comment: Comment on subjects unrelated to Formosa largely duplicates the content of the Home and International Service broadcasts.

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